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*  A	  subject’s	  belief	  is	  safe	  just	  in	  case	  the	  method	  she	  
employed	  to	  arrive	  at	  that	  belief	  did	  not	  put	  her	  in	  
serious	  epistemic	  danger,	  that	  is,	  serious	  danger	  of	  
arriving	  at	  a	  false	  belief	  thereby.	  	  
*  To	  say	  that	  a	  subject’s	  belief	  that	  p	  is	  safe	  is	  to	  say	  
that,	  were	  she	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  via	  this	  method,	  p	  
would	  be	  true.	  
*  Not	  easily	  would	  she	  have	  believed	  falsely	  via	  that	  
method.	  
What’s	  a	  safe	  belief?	  
*  If	  the	  safety	  condition	  is	  true,	  then	  a	  given	  belief	  
is	  known	  only	  if	  it	  is	  safe.	  
*  Here’s	  the	  general	  recipe	  for	  whipping	  up	  such	  a	  
counterexample:	  ﬁrst,	  pick	  the	  most	  virtuous	  
belief-­‐forming	  method	  you	  can	  imagine,	  and	  have	  
a	  subject	  form	  a	  belief	  via	  that	  method.	  	  
*  Second,	  add	  a	  twist	  of	  fate:	  put	  the	  method	  in	  
danger	  of	  malfunctioning,	  but	  let	  the	  danger	  
remain	  purely	  counterfactual.	  	  
Are	  all	  known	  beliefs	  safe?	  
*  Suppose	  that	  the	  world’s	  most	  accurate	  clock	  hangs	  in	  Smith’s	  
oﬃce,	  and	  Smith	  knows	  this.	  	  
*  This	  radiation	  sensor	  is	  very	  sensitive,	  however,	  and	  could	  easily	  
malfunction	  if	  a	  radioactive	  isotope	  were	  to	  decay	  in	  the	  vicinity.	  
This	  morning,	  against	  the	  odds,	  someone	  did	  in	  fact	  leave	  a	  small	  
amount	  of	  a	  radioactive	  isotope	  near	  the	  world’s	  most	  accurate	  
clock	  in	  Smith’s	  oﬃce.	  
*  The	  clock	  is	  running	  normally	  at	  8:22a.m.	  when	  Smith	  enters	  her	  
oﬃce.	  Smith	  takes	  a	  good	  hard	  look	  at	  the	  world’s	  most	  accurate	  
clock—what	  she	  knows	  is	  an	  extremely	  well-­‐designed	  clock	  that	  
has	  never	  been	  tampered	  with—and	  forms	  the	  true	  belief	  that	  it	  
is	  8:22a.m.	  
Atomic	  Clock	  
*  Since	  that	  danger	  remains	  purely	  counterfactual—since	  
the	  clock	  could	  have	  malfunctioned	  but	  in	  fact	  remained	  
the	  world’s	  most	  accurate	  clock;	  since	  things	  could	  have	  
gone	  less	  well	  epistemically	  but	  didn’t—it’s	  quite	  tempting	  
to	  allow	  that	  Smith	  knows	  the	  time	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
clock.	  	  
*  Very	  easily	  could	  she	  have	  believed	  falsely	  via	  that	  clock:	  
had	  the	  isotope	  decayed,	  which	  it	  easily	  might	  have,	  Smith	  
easily	  might	  have	  believed	  falsely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  clock.	  	  
*  So,	  it	  seems	  that	  Atomic	  Clock	  is	  a	  case	  of	  a	  known	  belief	  
that	  isn't	  safe.	  	  
Preliminary	  Diagnosis	  
*  As	  any	  timeshare	  owner	  can	  tell	  you,	  some	  things	  
aren’t	  how	  they	  seem.	  	  
*  Fernando	  Broncano-­‐Berrocal	  attempts	  to	  argue	  that	  
Atomic	  Clock	  is	  not	  all	  it	  looks	  to	  be.	  He	  concedes	  that	  
Smith	  does	  know	  the	  time	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  clock.	  
However,	  Broncano-­‐Berrocal	  argues	  that,	  contrary	  to	  
appearances,	  Smith’s	  belief	  is	  formed	  safely	  in	  Atomic	  
Clock.	  	  
Is	  Smith’s	  belief	  safe?	  
*  Evaluating	  whether	  the	  safety	  condition	  holds	  requires	  
that	  we	  examine	  the	  method	  used	  by	  Smith	  in	  the	  actual	  
world,	  and	  then	  compare	  the	  results	  of	  that	  very	  method	  in	  
nearby	  possible	  worlds.	  	  
*  Checking	  a	  broken	  clock	  is	  a	  diﬀerent	  way	  of	  forming	  
beliefs	  about	  the	  time	  than	  is	  checking	  a	  working	  clock.	  
The	  method	  that	  Smith	  actually	  uses—checking	  the	  
world’s	  most	  accurate	  clock—is	  diﬀerent	  from	  the	  method	  
that	  would	  easily	  have	  led	  her	  astray,	  namely	  checking	  a	  
clock	  that	  was	  stopped	  by	  that	  radioactive	  isotope.	  	  
What	  method	  did	  Smith	  use?	  
*  Even	  though	  they	  feel	  the	  same	  “from	  the	  inside,”	  forming	  a	  belief	  
about	  the	  time	  via	  this	  clock	  while	  it’s	  working	  is	  diﬀerent	  from	  forming	  
such	  a	  belief	  via	  this	  clock	  while	  it’s	  broken.	  	  
*  (R4)	  For	  any	  type	  of	  method	  of	  belief-­‐formation	  m1	  and	  for	  any	  type	  of	  
method	  of	  belief-­‐formation	  m2,	  m1	  =	  m2	  if	  and	  only	  if	  	  
*  (i)	  m1	  and	  m2	  are	  globally	  reliable	  to	  the	  same	  degree	  with	  respect	  to	  
the	  same	  ﬁeld	  of	  propositions	  and	  the	  same	  range	  of	  circumstances,	  	  
*  (ii)	  they	  are	  both	  based	  on	  vision	  or	  olfaction	  or	  audition	  or	  taction	  
or	  gustation	  or	  testimony	  or	  deduction	  or	  induction	  or	  memory	  etc.,	  
and	  	  
*  (iii)	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  target	  belief	  is	  formed	  via	  m2	  are	  
in	  the	  set	  of	  circumstances	  with	  respect	  to	  which	  m1	  is	  globally	  
reliable.	  
Broncano-­‐Berrocal	  Proposal	  
*  Broncano-­‐Berrocal	  claims	  that	  “[i]n	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  
Smith	  uses	  m2,	  a	  radioactive	  isotope	  has	  decayed	  disrupting	  the	  
clock’s	  sensor	  and	  stopping	  the	  clock.	  	  
*  Those	  circumstances	  are	  not	  in	  the	  set	  of	  circumstances	  with	  
respect	  to	  which	  m1,	  Smith’s	  actual	  method,	  is	  globally	  reliable.	  
Therefore,	  condition	  (iii)	  does	  not	  hold.”	  
*  And	  therefore,	  Atomic	  Clock	  does	  not,	  contrary	  to	  appearances,	  
feature	  a	  subject	  who	  knows	  via	  a	  method	  that	  could	  have	  gone	  
awry.	  It	  features,	  rather,	  a	  subject	  who	  knows	  via	  a	  method	  (a	  
working	  clock),	  but	  who	  easily	  might	  have	  failed	  to	  know	  via	  a	  
diﬀerent	  method	  that	  would	  have	  been	  indistinguishable	  to	  her	  
“from	  the	  inside”	  (a	  broken	  clock).	  But	  that	  doesn’t	  show	  that	  
the	  method	  the	  subject	  actually	  used	  was	  unsafe.	  
If	  Broncano-­‐Berrocal	  is	  right,	  is	  
Smith’s	  belief	  safe?	  
*  1.	  If	  (R4)	  is	  true,	  then	  Smith’s	  belief	  is	  safe	  in	  Atomic	  
Clock.	  
*  2.	  (R4)	  is	  true.	  
*  3.	  Therefore,	  Smith’s	  belief	  is	  safe	  in	  Atomic	  Clock.	  
Broncano-­‐Berrocal’s	  Argument	  
*  (R4)	  is	  false.	  	  
Our	  response	  
*  First,	  (R4)	  entails	  that	  there	  are	  no	  unreliable	  
methods.	  
*  Second,	  (R4)	  entails	  that	  there	  are	  no	  reliable	  
methods	  that	  have	  failure	  conditions.	  
Why	  is	  (R4)	  false?	  
*  Are	  there	  any	  unreliable	  ways	  of	  forming	  beliefs?	  No	  
need	  to	  answer;	  of	  course	  there	  are.	  	  
*  Take	  tyromancy:	  divination	  based	  on	  observing	  
cheese,	  especially	  when	  it	  is	  coagulating.	  Call	  that	  
method	  “m1,”	  and	  imagine	  employing	  it	  to	  arrive	  at	  
some	  belief:	  you	  consult	  your	  coagulating	  cheese,	  and	  
interpret	  its	  pattern	  as	  predicting	  that	  the	  Democrats	  
will	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  United	  States	  House	  of	  
Representatives	  in	  2014.	  	  
Are	  there	  unreliable	  methods?	  
*  Now	  imagine	  using	  that	  method	  again,	  at	  some	  later	  time,	  
in	  similar	  circumstances,	  to	  answer	  the	  same	  question.	  	  On	  
the	  second	  occasion,	  call	  it	  “m2.”	  Is	  m1	  =	  m2?	  By	  hypothesis,	  
yes,	  it’s	  the	  same	  terrible	  method:	  tyromancy.	  So	  far,	  so	  
good;	  this	  all	  seems	  perfectly	  possible.	  
*  (R4)	  For	  any	  type	  of	  method	  of	  belief-­‐formation	  m1	  and	  for	  
any	  type	  of	  method	  of	  belief-­‐formation	  m2,	  m1	  =	  m2	  if	  and	  
only	  if	  	  
*  (iii)	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  target	  belief	  is	  formed	  via	  
m2	  are	  in	  the	  set	  of	  circumstances	  with	  respect	  to	  which	  m1	  is	  
globally	  reliable.	  
Are	  there	  unreliable	  methods?	  
*  Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  you	  form	  a	  belief	  about	  the	  
product	  of	  a	  complicated	  multiplication	  problem	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  your	  electronic	  calculator	  here,	  dry,	  at	  sea-­‐level.	  
name	  that	  method	  “m1.”	  	  
*  Now	  suppose	  you	  use	  your	  calculator	  again,	  but	  this	  time	  
under	  water,	  where	  calculators	  like	  that	  are	  unreliable.	  On	  
that	  second	  occasion,	  baptize	  the	  method	  you	  used	  “m2.”	  
Is	  m1	  =	  m2?	  
*  	  Intuitively,	  we’d	  say,	  yes	  of	  course:	  you’ve	  used	  the	  same	  
method	  in	  two	  diﬀerent	  circumstances	  (the	  ﬁrst	  
auspicious,	  the	  second	  not).	  	  
Can	  a	  reliable	  method	  ever	  fail?	  
*  (R4)	  For	  any	  type	  of	  method	  of	  belief-­‐formation	  m1	  and	  for	  
any	  type	  of	  method	  of	  belief-­‐formation	  m2,	  m1	  =	  m2	  if	  and	  
only	  if	  	  
*  (iii)	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  target	  belief	  is	  formed	  via	  
m2	  are	  in	  the	  set	  of	  circumstances	  with	  respect	  to	  which	  m1	  is	  
globally	  reliable.	  
*  In	  the	  case	  we	  described,	  condition	  (iii)	  is	  not	  satisﬁed.	  The	  
circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  target	  belief	  is	  formed	  via	  m2	  
are	  not	  in	  the	  set	  of	  circumstances	  with	  respect	  to	  which	  
m1	  is	  globally	  reliable.	  By	  hypothesis,	  m1	  is	  unreliable	  under	  
water,	  and	  m2	  was	  used	  under	  water.	  So,	  (R4)	  entails	  that	  
m1	  ≠	  m2.	  	  
	  
Can	  a	  reliable	  method	  ever	  fail?	  
*  Broncano-­‐Berrocal	  oﬀers	  the	  safety	  theorist	  a	  victory	  
so	  ruinous	  it’s	  tantamount	  to	  defeat.	  Instead,	  let’s	  
cleave	  to	  the	  conviction	  that	  methods	  can	  fail.	  	  
*  In	  Atomic	  Clock,	  Smith’s	  clock	  is	  the	  same	  method	  of	  
telling	  the	  time	  whether	  the	  clock	  is	  running	  or	  
stopped	  (though	  we	  suggest	  you	  use	  that	  method	  
only	  when	  it’s	  running).	  	  
Should	  one	  accept	  (R4)?	  
*  But	  if	  there	  really	  is	  only	  one	  method	  in	  play	  in	  Atomic	  
Clock,	  then	  Smith	  is	  indeed	  awash	  in	  a	  sea	  of	  nearby	  
possible	  worlds	  where	  she	  forms	  false	  beliefs	  using	  the	  
same	  method	  that	  delivered	  a	  true	  belief	  in	  the	  actual	  
world.	  	  
*  And	  so	  her	  belief	  really	  was	  formed	  unsafely,	  despite	  the	  
fact	  that—as	  Broncano-­‐Berrocal	  admits—Smith’s	  belief	  is	  
genuine	  knowledge.	  	  
*  But	  then	  knowledge	  need	  not	  be	  safe,	  and	  the	  safety	  
condition	  is	  false.	  And	  therefore	  safety	  really	  is	  in	  serious	  
danger.	  
Conclusion	  
